

St. Andrews Dec<sup>r</sup> 14 1854

My dear Sir John,

I am glad you have sent  
me Mill's letter, for there  
would be no fun if I was  
to have it all my own  
way, like a bull in a  
China Shop. The result  
of our experiment was just  
what have been expected, —  
what indeed was inevitable;  
for Mills admission that  
I was right would have  
been equivalent to an  
admission that he was  
wrong in all that he

had ever done in philosophy. I  
sometimes chuckled at the  
dilemma to which I thought  
my book might reduce him  
if fairly piqued; but I never  
seriously doubted that he  
w[oul]d stand manfully to his own  
horn, & refuse to  
recant the labours of  
life-time. His point of  
opposition comes out at the  
conclusion of his letter where  
he denies that there are  
any "necessary truths of reason". He takes up as  
thrown down to him

specially, as indeed it was,  
the gauntlet to be found in

§ 26 & § 30 of the  
introduction. This was to  
be expected, & is all  
fair. But when he goes on  
to find fault with the logic  
of the book, his letter becomes  
a curiosity which I would  
gladly be allowed to print  
(if the work ever reaches  
a second edition) as a  
confirmation of what I  
advance regarding the  
imbecillity of all  
p[s]ychological thinking. The

Man who admits that it  
is impossible to know  
one thing without knowing  
two things, & who yet  
contends that two things  
do not require to be  
known whenever one  
thing is known, must  
either labour under  
some strange misappre-  
hension as to Props I  
& II, or must have  
a singularly constituted head[.]

I will return you the letter  
when I have conned it a  
little more

Yours aff[ectionately]

J.F. Ferrier